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Sterling financial markets
Overview
Over the review period, financial market developments were
dominated by expectations of further monetary policy
measures by some central banks and concerns about the
sustainability of fiscal positions in certain euro-area member
countries.  
In the United States and the United Kingdom, market
expectations of further monetary stimulus had been building
following weaker-than-expected macroeconomic data and
comments by monetary policy makers.  Reflecting this,
government bond yields initially fell.  The US Federal Reserve
announced in November that it would increase its 
purchases of government assets.  In the United Kingdom,
expectations of further asset purchases receded following a
stronger-than-expected third-quarter GDP release and the
November Inflation Report.  Government bond yields
subsequently rose.  
In the euro area, a deteriorating economic outlook in some
member countries and revelations of further losses at certain
banks contributed to perceptions of worsening fiscal positions
in some vulnerable economies.  This was compounded by
uncertainty about the future resolution mechanism for
sovereign debt crises.  During the review period, market
participants appeared to differentiate among euro-area
sovereign issuers.  Following the review period, concerns over
sovereign risk in the euro area became more widespread.
Against this backdrop, there seems to have been a secular
improvement in bank funding markets;  the major UK banks
have been able to access a wider range of long-term funding
instruments than earlier in the year — although some
indicators of stress were beginning to rise towards the end of
the review period.
Recent developments in sterling capital markets
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) maintained a highly accommodative
monetary policy stance.  Bank Rate and the stock of asset
purchases were left unchanged at 0.5% and £200 billion
respectively throughout the review period.  
In the United States, the Federal Reserve announced further
monetary policy measures to promote a stronger pace of
economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time,
is at levels consistent with its mandate.  At its November
meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
decided to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term 
US Treasury bonds by June 2011 and to continue to reinvest
principal payments from its securities holdings.
A Reuters poll released at the end of October showed that
expectations of further asset purchases had also increased in
the United Kingdom in the run-up to the November policy
meeting;  a majority of respondents expected further asset
purchases.  However, contacts noted that these expectations
receded somewhat following stronger-than-expected 
third-quarter UK GDP data.  The probability attached to further
asset purchases reportedly continued to decline following the
publication of the November Inflation Report.  Consistent with
this, the November Reuters poll showed that only a minority
of respondents expected further asset purchases.
Turning to market expectations of future policy rates, UK
short-term overnight index swap (OIS) rates fell slightly in the
earlier part of the review period.  But they rose subsequently
to end the period slightly higher (Chart 1).  Elsewhere, OIS
rates fell in the United States on firming expectations of
further monetary stimulus.  Within the euro area, the euro
overnight index average rose as the total level of liquidity
supplied by the European Central Bank (ECB) declined.
Contacts highlighted a sharp increase in overnight rates
following the net maturity of €92 billion at the end of
September.  And contacts attributed a rise in euro OIS rates to
a firming of expectations during the period that the
normalisation process started by the ECB in relation to its
liquidity operations would continue.
This article reviews developments in sterling financial markets, including the Bank’s official
operations, since the 2010 Q3 Quarterly Bulletin up to 19 November 2010.
(1) The article also
summarises market intelligence on selected topical issues relating to market functioning.  
(1) The data cut-off for the previous Bulletin was 27 August 2010.
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At the very short end of the sterling money market curve,
overnight interest rates generally remained close to Bank Rate.
However, unsecured overnight interest rates rose gradually
over the review period, while volatility in the secured overnight
rate increased (Chart 2).  Increased volatility in secured
overnight interest rates is often seen at times of changes in
collateral supply.  Secured overnight rates tend to rise with an
increased quantity of available collateral as lenders of 
cash require an additional return to finance the increased
collateral supply.  Indeed, some contacts suggested that
collateral released following maturing ECB operations,
especially at the end of September, might have affected the
sterling overnight secured interest rate.  This would most likely
have occurred via displacement on account of the differing
quality of collateral maturing from the ECB and the collateral
used in sterling overnight secured markets.
Bank funding markets
The spread of short-term interbank borrowing rates relative to
OIS rates, an indicator of bank funding conditions, was little
changed since the previous Bulletin (Chart 3).  Another
indicator, the cost of interbank borrowing via cross-currency
funding markets, compares the difference in cost between
borrowing euro or sterling and swapping the proceeds into 
US dollars, with funding directly in dollars.  These spreads fell
over the period as a whole, though the euro-implied spread
rose in November as concerns around debt sustainability in
some European countries reintensified (Chart 4).
Measures of longer-term funding costs for UK banks fell in
early October, but rose subsequently to end the period slightly
lower.  Consistent with this, five-year UK bank credit default
swap (CDS) premia, one indicator of long-term funding costs,
declined somewhat (Chart 5).






















Sources:  BrokerTec, Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s overnight index swap (OIS) curves.


















Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings.


















Sources:  British Bankers’ Association, Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of three-month US dollar Libor implied from foreign exchange forwards over actual
three-month US dollar Libor.  For more details on the construction of these measures, see
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 2, page 134, Chart 26 and BIS Quarterly
Review, March 2008, pages 73–86.
Chart 4 Spread of foreign exchange implied cost of
three-month US dollar funding over US dollar Libor(a)244 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Contacts suggested that two main factors had contributed
towards a continued improvement in sentiment towards banks
internationally earlier in the period.  First, the time permitted
for banks to comply with new international bank regulations
(the so-called Basel III rules) was longer than previously
expected.  Second, bank earnings in the third quarter of 2010
were generally higher, and loss provisions lower, than analysts’
expectations.  Later in the period, however, concerns about
debt sustainability in some European countries re-emerged,
which put upward pressure on longer-term funding costs.
In the United Kingdom, investors’ assessment of UK banks’
funding positions reportedly improved following the disclosure
that banks had already repaid a large share of their borrowing
under the Special Liquidity Scheme.  The box on pages 246–47
shows that banks have incorporated a gradual repayment of
their borrowing under the scheme into their funding plans.  In
contrast, in the United States, sentiment towards some banks
was diminished somewhat by concerns over mortgage
origination, servicing and foreclosure practices.  
Against this backdrop, UK banks’ debt issuance was 
particularly strong earlier in the period (Chart 6).  Banks issued
over £15 billion senior debt and were able to issue around 
£20 billion of covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) over the period as a whole.  Signs of renewed
activity in asset-backed securities were tempered by the small
number of investors in these transactions.  The forthcoming
Financial Stability Report will discuss these issues, including the
funding requirements for UK banks, in more detail.
Long-term interest rates
During the earlier part of the review period, international 
long-term nominal interest rates approached historically low
levels.  Expectations of further asset purchases by the 
US Federal Reserve and the Bank reportedly contributed to
these falls.  Following the FOMC’s announcement of further
purchases in November and stronger-than-expected
macroeconomic data, these expectations receded somewhat.
This reportedly contributed to the subsequent rise in bond
yields.  Overall, during the review period, international forward
yield curves shifted higher, most notably in the United States
(Chart 7). 
Nominal interest rates can be decomposed into movements 
in real forward interest rates and a forward inflation rate.  




















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior credit default swaps (CDS) prices.
(b) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and 
Morgan Stanley.
(c) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(d) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,
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Sources:  Bank of England, Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) The major UK banks are defined as Banco Santander, Barclays, Co-operative Financial
Services, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide and RBS.
(b) This refers primarily to issuance in excess of 18 months in public markets.
(c) Medium-term notes.  
(d) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(e) Residential mortgage-backed securities.
(f) Excludes senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
(g) Asset-backed securities.
(h) Data up to 19 November.
Chart 6 Major UK banks’(a) issuance in term public(b)
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by France and Germany.
Chart 7 International nominal government bond yield
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Market-based measures of medium-term inflation
expectations derived from index-linked bonds rose during the
review period, particularly in the United States (Chart 8).
Contacts suggest this may have been exacerbated by an
increase in demand for inflation protection in a relatively less
liquid market, thereby lowering real yields relative to nominal
yields.  Indeed, equivalent measures derived from UK inflation
swaps rose by less over the review period.  
In the euro area, concerns about the sustainability of the fiscal
position of some member countries, notably Ireland and
Portugal, reintensified during the review period.  Contacts
noted in particular the difficulties in the approval process of
austerity measures in Portugal and further revelations about
the impact of banking sector losses on public finances in
Ireland.  After the end of the review period, the Irish authorities
requested the use of European Union support facilities,
provided in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund.
The estimated financing need would be up to €85 billion until
the end of 2013, with a potential total external assistance of
€67.5 billion. 
Yields on Irish and Portuguese government bonds rose
markedly relative to German government bond yields 
(Chart 9).  Toward the end of the review period, LCH.Clearnet
Ltd increased the margin requirement on Irish government
bonds.  Contacts noted that this might have amplified some of
the widening in the spread of Irish bonds. 
Contacts thought that market participants increasingly
differentiated between sovereign credits.  Indeed, in contrast
to earlier periods when yield spreads of vulnerable euro-area
government bonds to German government bonds tended to
move together, Italian and Spanish government spreads ended
the period little changed.  Following the review period,
however, concerns over sovereign risk in the euro area became
more widespread.
In explaining the recent widening of euro-area spreads,
contacts put some weight on proposals put forward for a
permanent resolution mechanism of sovereign debt crises.
Contacts noted that yield spreads widened more for those
sovereigns potentially more likely to be affected by such a
mechanism. 
The liquidity of those sovereign bond markets, as measured by
bid-offer spreads, deteriorated (Chart 10).  In order to
facilitate the functioning of these markets, the ECB stepped up
its sovereign bond purchases somewhat through its Securities



















Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Sterling forward inflation rates are derived from instruments that reference RPI inflation,
while US dollar and euro forward inflation rates are derived from instruments referencing CPI
inflation.
(b) Sterling and US forward inflation rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
Euro forward inflation rates derived using the Bank’s inflation swap curve.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread over ten-year German government bond yield.
Chart 9 Selected European ten-year government bond
spreads(a)
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Operations within the sterling monetary
framework
The level of reserves continued to be determined by (i) the
stock of reserves injected via asset purchases, (ii) the level 
of reserves supplied by long-term repo open market 
operations (OMOs) and (iii) the net impact of other sterling
(‘autonomous factor’) flows across the Bank’s balance sheet.
The box on pages 248–49 provides more detail on the 
Asset Purchase Facility (APF).  This box describes in more detail
the Bank’s operations within the sterling monetary framework
over the review period.
Operational Standing Facilities
Since 5 March 2009, the rate paid on the Operational Standing
Deposit Facility has been zero.  Reflecting this, average use of
the deposit facility was £0 million in each of the maintenance
periods under review.  Average use of the lending facility was
also £0 million throughout the period.
Indexed long-term repo OMOs
The Bank also offers liquidity insurance to the banking system
via long-term repo (LTR) operations.  The Bank recently 
redesigned these operations to provide a permanent and more
effective liquidity insurance facility, against a wide range of
collateral.  The new operations, which are indexed to 
Bank Rate, replace both the three-month wider collateral
operations and the narrow OMO collateral six, nine and
twelve-month operations.(1)
The Bank offered £5 billion via three-month indexed long-term
repo (ILTR) operations on both 14 September and 12 October,
and £2.5 billion via a six-month operation on 16 November.
Cover was similar to earlier ILTR operations (Table 1).  
The proportion of the three-month operations allocated to
wider collateral in September and October fell compared to
those held in June and July from an average of 17% to 12%.
The stop-out spread (the difference between clearing spreads
for wider and narrow collateral) fell to 20 basis points in
October, compared to 25–26 basis points in the three previous
three-month ILTR operations (Chart A).  This primarily
reflected a fall in the wider collateral clearing spread.
The six-month operation held on 16 November produced a
stop-out spread of 48 basis points.  This was similar to the
previous six-month operation in August, where the stop-out
spread was 49 basis points.  The proportion of funds allocated
against wider collateral in November rose to 26%, from 24%
in August. 
Reserves provided via ILTRs were more than offset by the
maturity of the previous LTR operations.  Consequently, the
stock of liquidity provided through longer-term operations
declined.
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) is a permanent facility to
provide liquidity insurance to the banking system.  It allows
eligible banks to borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral.
On 5 October, the Bank announced that the average daily
amount outstanding in the 30-day DWF between 1 April and 
Table 1 Indexed long-term repo operations
Total Collateral set summary
Narrow Wider
14 September 2010 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 7,346 6,586  760
Amount allotted (£ millions) 5,000  4,440  560
Cover 1.47 1.32 0.15
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 12 6
Stop-out spread(c) 25
12 October 2010 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 5,905 5,260 645
Amount allotted (£ millions) 5,000 4,355  645
Cover 1.18 1.05 0.13
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 12 1
Stop-out spread(c) 20
16 November 2010 (six-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 2,500
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 5,713 4,920 793
Amount allotted (£ millions) 2,500 1,857 643
Cover 2.29 1.97 0.32
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 25 0
Stop-out spread(c) 48
(a) Due to the treatment of paired bids, the sum of bids received by collateral set may not equal total bids
received.
(b) Amounts shown in basis points.
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30 June 2010 was £0 million.  The Bank also announced that
the average daily amount outstanding in the 364-day DWF
between 1 April and 30 June 2009 was £0 million.  For
information on the changes to the collateral accepted in the
DWF, see the box on page 251.
Other operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was introduced in 
April 2008 to improve the liquidity position of the banking
system by allowing banks and building societies to swap their
high-quality mortgage-backed and other securities for UK
Treasury bills for up to three years.  The Scheme was designed
to finance part of the overhang of illiquid assets on banks’
balance sheets by exchanging them temporarily for more
easily tradable assets. 
At the end of January 2009 (when the drawdown period for
the SLS closed), £185 billion of UK Treasury bills had been lent
under the SLS.  In order to prevent a refinancing ‘cliff’ the 
Bank held bilateral discussions with users of the Scheme to
ensure that there were credible funding plans in place to
reduce their use of the Scheme in a smooth fashion.  The
impact of these expected repayment plans are shown in
aggregate in Chart B, along with the repayment profile based
on counterparties’ contractual repayment obligations.  Some 
£75 billion had already been repaid by end-November.
US dollar repo operations
In response to renewed strains in the short-term funding
market for US dollars, from 11 May the Bank, in concert with
other central banks, reintroduced weekly fixed-rate tenders
with a seven-day maturity to offer US dollar liquidity.  As of 
19 November 2010, there had been no use of the facility.
Bank of England balance sheet:  capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, eg in the Bank for International Settlements and
European Central Bank, and the Bank’s physical assets) and
aggregate cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
The portfolio currently includes around £4.1 billion of gilts and
£0.6 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period from 
20 August 2010 to 18 November 2010, gilt purchases were
made in accordance with the quarterly announcements on 
1 July 2010 and 1 October 2010. 
(1) For further details see ‘The Bank’s new indexed long-term repo operations’, in the
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Asset purchases
The Bank did not undertake any Asset Purchase Facility (APF)
gilt purchases over the review period.  As a result, the stock of
gilts held by the APF in terms of the amount paid to sellers
remained at £198.3 billion.(1) The Bank continued to offer to
lend some of its gilt holdings via the Debt Management Office
(DMO) in return for other UK government collateral.  
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management
operations continued, in line with the arrangements
announced on 29 January 2009. 
Table 1 summarises operations under the APF over the review
period by type of asset.
Gilt lending facility
In the three months to 30 September 2010 a daily average of
£279 million of gilts were lent as part of the gilt lending
facility.  This was down from an average of £2.12 billion in the
previous quarter.  The box on page 253 provides more detail on
the gilt lending facility. 
Corporate bonds
In order to improve the functioning of the sterling corporate
bond market, the Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell
corporate bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme.
Over the review period, activity in the Bank’s auctions
continued to be driven by broader market conditions, which
were little changed since the previous Bulletin.  The level of
participation in both the purchase and sales operations (in
terms of the level of transactions with the Bank) fell.  As of 
18 November 2010, the Bank portfolio totalled £1,516 million,
compared to £1,571 million at the end of the previous review
period on 26 August 2010, as the Bank sold more bonds than it
purchased.  Market contacts suggested that this reflected the
limited scale of new issuance in the wider market. 
Reflecting the improved conditions in the corporate bond
market since the Scheme was introduced in March 2009, the
Bank announced on 15 November that it would adapt its
reserve prices to permit relatively more sales of corporate
bonds in the future.  The Scheme will continue to offer to buy
and sell corporate bonds to serve a useful role as a backstop,
particularly during periods of market uncertainty.
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
Spreads on sterling-denominated CP were little changed
during the reporting period.  Therefore, the majority of primary
spreads remained below the spreads at which the APF offers to
purchase CP.  Accordingly, the stock of APF purchases fell to 
£0 million on 3 September, and remained at that level for the
Table 1 APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
Purchases Sales
26 August 2010(c)(d) 120 198,275 1,571 199,966
2 September 2010 0 0 5 2 3
9 September 2010 0 0 0 0 0
16 September 2010 0 0 0 4 -4
23 September 2010 0 0 7 0 7
30 September 2010 0 0 4 2 2
7 October 2010 0 0 0 0 0
14 October 2010 0 0 0 12 -12
21 October 2010 0 0 0 2 -2
28 October 2010 0 0 0 16 -16
4 November 2010 0 0 0 6 -6
11 November 2010 0 0 3 1 2
18 November 2010 0 0 0 11 -11
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) 0 – 341 341
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) 0 198,275 1,175 199,451
Total asset purchases(d)(e) 0 198,275 1,516 199,792
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 26 August 2010.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 249
remainder of the reporting period.  On 15 November, the Bank
provided twelve months’ notice of its intention to withdraw
this scheme, reflecting improvements in the market.  
Over the review period, the stock of CP issued by UK corporate
and non-bank firms fell to around £2.2 billion, down from 
£2.5 billion at the time of the previous Bulletin. 
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(2)
While there had been no use of the facility during the review
period, the Bank announced on 15 November that it had
recognised the eligibility of a programme for this facility.  This
programme has subsequently drawn on the facility. 
Credit Guarantee Scheme 
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme from the secondary
market over the period under review.
On 15 November, the Bank announced the withdrawal of this
Scheme, reflecting the improvements in market functioning
over the past year.
(1) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
(2) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.250 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Corporate capital markets
International equity prices rose markedly (Chart 11).  These
rises reflected at least in part an improvement in corporate
earnings expectations.  Indeed, third-quarter earnings 
were generally better than expected, most notably for 
US companies.  Additionally, forward-looking measures of
earnings also improved.  For example, the November Bank of
America/Merrill Lynch Fund Manager survey showed that
around 68% of respondents expected global corporate
earnings to improve over the coming year, up from just over
50% in August.  Furthermore, dividend swap prices rose,
perhaps suggesting that market participants revised higher
their expectations for future corporate earnings.(1)
According to contacts, firming expectations of further
monetary easing led investors to reduce their perceptions of
downside risk to equity prices.  Perhaps consistent with that,
the skews of option-implied probability distributions of equity
returns initially became less negative, although they fell back
subsequently (Chart 12).  Option-implied equity volatilities fell
since the previous Bulletin.  This may reflect a reduction in
uncertainty surrounding the financial outlook for businesses.
Less negative skews and lower volatilities would be consistent
with a fall in the equity risk premium.
The more accommodative stance of US monetary policy
reportedly also supported capital inflows in emerging market
economies (EMEs).  This is likely to have contributed to the
sharp increases in EME asset prices over the review period.
However, contacts noted that other factors also played a role,
including a reassessment by some investors of the expected
returns on EME assets relative to developed economies.
Overall, the net effect of lower equity risk premia and higher
government bond yields was to lower an indicative measure of
the nominal cost of equity finance for UK companies 
(Chart 13).
Investment-grade, non-financial corporate bond spreads over
government bond yields of a comparable maturity were
broadly unchanged (Chart 14).  Consistent with the
substantial improvement in conditions in the sterling
corporate bond market since the Bank’s Corporate Bond
Secondary Market Scheme was introduced in March 2009, 
the Bank announced changes to the Scheme (see the box on
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(b) The MSCI Emerging Markets index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
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(a) A negatively skewed distribution is one for which large negative deviations from the mean are
more likely than large positive deviations.
Chart 12 Three-month option-implied volatility and
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Sources:  Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The cost of equity is measured as a risk-free rate plus an equity risk premium.  The risk-free
rate is approximated by a ten-year nominal gilt yield and the equity risk premium is inferred
from a dividend discount model.  For further details of the latter, see Inkinen, M, 
Stringa, M and Voutsinou, K (2010), ‘Interpreting equity price movements since the start of
the financial crisis’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 1, pages 24–33.
(b) The cost of bond finance is measured as the average yield-to-maturity on the Bank of
America/Merrill Lynch Sterling Corporate Industrials and Utilities indices.
Chart 13 Indicative cost of sterling corporate bond and
equity finance
(1) For more details on dividend swaps, see the box ‘Dividend swaps’ in the Bank of
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Changes to collateral accepted in the Bank’s
liquidity insurance operations
The Bank provides liquidity insurance to the banking system
through its Discount Window Facility (DWF) and indexed 
long-term repo (ILTR) operations.  In these operations the Bank
accepts a wider range of collateral than it accepts in its 
short-term repo operations or in the operational lending
facility. 
On 30 November, the Bank published details of two changes it
is making to the collateral that it accepts in these facilities in
order to further enhance the Bank’s ability to provide 
short-term liquidity insurance to counterparties, thereby
underpinning confidence in the financial system. 
In particular, from April 2011 the Bank will widen the pool of
collateral eligible for use in the DWF, to include portfolios of
loans alongside marketable securities.  The Bank has also
decided to amend its eligibility criteria to require enhanced
disclosure of information relating to certain securities, starting
in 2011. 
Loan portfolios in the DWF
The DWF enables banks and building societies to borrow gilts
against a wide range of collateral.  It is intended for sound
institutions that need temporary access to liquidity, but not as
a source of long-term funding.  
To obtain gilts, counterparties can pledge securitisations or
covered bonds comprising loans they have originated
themselves.  However, the process of creating such 
‘own-name’ securities can be costly and time consuming for
counterparties.  It also introduces added complexity, as
securitisations generally include derivative instruments such as
swaps, and other structural features, which create risks that
the Bank has to manage.
By extending eligibility to portfolios of loans, the Bank intends
to allow the main assets of most banks and building societies
to be used as collateral in the DWF without the need for
securitisation.
The Bank will apply the same standards for eligibility and risk
management as for other collateral in the DWF.  This means
that loan portfolios will be subject to a rigorous approval
process including regular reviews.  And it will be necessary for
counterparties to pre-position loan portfolios with the Bank.
Information transparency for asset-backed securities
and covered bonds
Since December 2007 the Bank has accepted asset-backed
securities (ABS) and covered bonds in its liquidity insurance
operations.  One of the Bank’s guiding principles for its market
operations is that it must be able to manage risk and value the
collateral it accepts.  In view of this, the Bank has considered
the information that it requires from issuers of ABS in order to
be able to risk manage its collateral more effectively and
efficiently.
The Bank has therefore decided to amend its eligibility criteria
to require enhanced disclosure of information relating to these
securities.  While driven by the Bank’s own risk management
requirements, the Bank considers it important that this
information be provided not only to the Bank but also to
market participants to help improve market-wide
transparency. 
The Bank’s new transparency requirements will require banks
who originate securities to make the following available to
market participants in order for their securities to remain
eligible:
￿ Detailed information about the loans included within the
securitisation.  For most asset classes this will take the form
of loan-level data including details of the borrower,
underlying assets and performance of each loan, to be
provided on every quarter.
￿ The prospectus and other key legal documents.
￿ Monthly reports about the security containing a standard
set of minimum information.   
￿ A summary of the structure of individual transactions
including the rights of bond or note holders.
￿ For ABS, a cash-flow model of each transaction which
accurately represents how cash flows through the structure
to the end-investor.
In order to give participants in the Bank’s operations time to
fully comply with these requirements, their implementation
will be staggered.  The publication of the prospectus and other
key documents will be required from July 2011 for all asset
classes, but the remaining requirements will initially apply
from December 2011 to residential mortgage-backed securities
and covered bonds backed by residential mortgages.  The
application of these full requirements will gradually be
extended to remaining asset classes by the end of 2012. 
The Bank’s actions in this area have not been taken in isolation.
Other authorities, including the European Central Bank, have
indicated that they will impose greater information
transparency requirements on ABS, and the new EU Capital
Requirements Directive will require investors to undertake
their own risk assessment of securities in which they invest.
Where possible the Bank has tried to ensure that its
requirements will be complementary and consistent with
these other initiatives.252 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Gross corporate bond issuance by UK private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs) picked up in September, following
muted issuance in August.  In 2010 to date, gross issuance
surpassed its annual average over 2000–07 on the back of
strong issuance for non-investment grade companies, though
it fell short of the exceptional levels seen in 2009.
Furthermore, the proportion of corporations issuing bonds for
the first time continued to increase in 2010 (Chart 15).  The
majority of the new issuers in the United Kingdom reportedly
used the proceeds to repay maturing bank loans.  This seems
consistent with ongoing disintermediation of banks by UK
companies.
Notwithstanding relatively strong gross bond issuance,
aggregate net bond issuance by UK PNFCs was only mildly
positive from August to October.  At the same time, equity
issuance net of share buybacks was limited (Chart 16).
Combined with a continued strong net reduction in bank
loans, this suggests that, in aggregate, UK PNFCs continued to
deleverage their balance sheets in 2010, although at a slower
pace than in 2009.
Foreign exchange
Expectations of further monetary policy measures, in
particular in the United States, were also reflected in
developments in exchange rates.  In particular, the US dollar
depreciated against the currencies of its major trading partners
(Chart 17).
The sterling effective exchange rate index (ERI) depreciated by
1.8% since the previous Bulletin.  This masked divergent moves
against the two largest constituents of the sterling ERI;
sterling appreciated 3.1% against the US dollar and
depreciated 4% against the euro.  
Movements in relative interest rates accounted for most of the
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Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) The proportion of first-time bond issuers relative to the total number of bond issuers 
in a given year, for parent companies based in the United Kingdom, United States and the
euro area.
(b) The back data include all euro-area countries as of 19 November 2010. 
Chart 15 Proportion of first-time PNFC bond issuers(a)
















(a) Non seasonally adjusted.
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Gilt lending facility
The Bank operates a gilt lending facility with the 
Debt Management Office (DMO) in which it makes available
to the DMO a significant amount of gilts purchased via the
Asset Purchase Facility (APF) for on-lending to the market.
This facility was launched on 7 August 2009 to relieve frictions
in the functioning of the gilt repo market arising from the
Bank’s APF purchases.  This box describes the impact of the
facility on the gilt repo market and the facility’s usage.
Causes of frictions in the gilt repo market
Frictions can appear in the gilt repo market when particular
gilts are in short supply relative to their demand.  This can
occur when institutions — including pension funds, central
banks or sovereign wealth funds — have significant holdings
that, for a variety of reasons, they may be unwilling to lend out
during periods of uncertainty and short supply.
The impact of the gilt lending facility
In March 2009, the Monetary Policy Committee announced a
programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of
central bank reserves (commonly known as quantitative
easing).  Asset purchases were spread across a range of gilts
but, by August 2009, the APF gilt purchase operations had
contributed to shortages of certain gilts in the open market.  
Market participants suggested the impact could be most
clearly seen in the repo rates for four bonds (the 5% 2014,
43/$% 2015, 5% 2018 and 43/$% 2020).  By July and August,
the weighted average overnight repo rate for each of these
bonds was consistently around 30 basis points above the
weighted average general secured overnight repo.
Consequently, market participants would have had to lend
cash at a rate significantly below the general secured overnight
rate in order to obtain any of these specific bonds (Chart A).
The Bank responded by launching the gilt lending facility in
August 2009.  The DMO may lend the gilts for a term of up to
one week.(1) In return for the loan of specific APF gilts, the
DMO delivers to the Bank UK government securities of
equivalent value.  Therefore, the APF’s holdings of UK
government securities are unaffected.  There is also no net
impact on the DMO’s cash management operations.(2)
Immediately upon launch of the facility, repo rates stabilised
on these bonds and, by the second day of the facility being
available, spreads fell below 20 basis points.  Subsequently,
spreads have largely remained below the heightened levels
seen previously.  
The gilt lending facility also triggered a fall in usage of the
DMO’s Standing Repo Facility and Special Repo Facility.  In the
month prior to the introduction of the gilt lending facility,
usage of the DMO’s facilities had been around £2 billion daily,
the vast majority of which involved the four bonds in Chart A.
In the twelve months subsequent to the launch, usage has
fallen to a daily average of around £4.7 million.(3)
Usage of the gilt lending facility 
The gilt lending facility was used heavily after it was launched
(Chart B).  As expected, usage has been concentrated in gilts
in which the Bank holds a large proportion of the free float:
the total amount of a gilt in issue less the amount held by the
UK Government.  In the past two quarters, usage of the facility
has reduced significantly as new DMO primary issuance has
resulted in higher private sector holdings of gilts that had
previously been in short supply.
(1) The Bank makes available at least 10% of the APF’s holdings of each stock, and more
where the APF’s holding is greater than 50% of the ‘free float’ (total issuance size less
government holdings).
(2) In addition, the Bank is prepared to make the APF’s gilts available for use in the DMO’s
Standing Repo facility (this facility allows any gilt to be borrowed overnight at a
current rate of 0.10%, with a simultaneous reverse repo trade executed at Bank Rate).
(3) The Special Repo Facility was suspended on 28 August 2009.  It had operated in a
similar way to the Standing Repo Facility except that certain terms — such as the
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Chart B Average daily aggregate value of gilts lent
through the APF gilt lending facility to the DMO on a
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the US dollar (Chart 18).  In contrast, the depreciation of
sterling against the euro appeared to reflect other factors.  For
example, during the first half of the review period, contacts
suggested that asset managers had increased their holdings of
euro-area assets as concerns over the sustainability of fiscal
positions of some European countries subsided.  This perhaps
suggested that changes in relative risk premia accounted for
some of the developments in the sterling-euro exchange rate.
However, these concerns reintensified towards the end of the
period.
Option-implied volatility, a market-based measure of
uncertainty, increased for a number of currency pairs.
Contacts have cited a number of factors contributing to a rise
in uncertainty in currency markets.  These included market
participants revising their expectations of further
unconventional monetary policy measures in some countries;
the challenge faced by a number of EMEs in managing the
consequences of large-scale capital inflows;  the prospects of
taxes on capital flows or capital controls;  and official
intervention in the currency markets by a number of countries.
Market intelligence on developments in
market structure
In discharging its responsibilities to maintain monetary and
contribute to financial stability, the Bank gathers information
from contacts across a wide spectrum of financial markets.
This intelligence helps inform the Bank’s assessment of
monetary conditions and possible sources of financial
instability and is routinely synthesised with research and
analysis in the Inflation Report and the Financial Stability
Report.  More generally, regular dialogue with market contacts
provides valuable insights about how markets function, which
provides context for policy formulation, including the design
and evaluation of the Bank’s own market operations.  And the
Bank conducts occasional market surveys to gather additional
quantitative information on certain markets.
Emergence of long-dated funding
Funding pressures continue to encourage innovations in the
funding instruments used by banks.  Some of these
instruments were discussed in the previous Quarterly Bulletin.
This section summarises recent market intelligence on the
emergence this year of long-dated secured funding
transactions.
Characteristics
Long-dated secured funding transactions typically involve
banks raising two to seven-year funding against 
investment-grade asset-backed securities (ABS).  UK banks
have been particularly active issuers of this funding, with over
£15 billion issued in 2010, although this represents a small
proportion of banks’ overall liabilities.  Anecdotal evidence
suggested further issuance was possible.  
Long-dated secured funding was primarily a funding tool as it
does not involve risk transfer nor have capital benefits, as the
risks associated with the collateral remained with the bank
raising funding.  
Structure
There are two main types of long-dated secured funding
instruments, although they are economically equivalent.
Usage was reportedly fairly evenly split between the two, with
some banks funding via both forms. 
Conventional repo transaction
In a conventional long-dated repo transaction a bank sells an
asset in exchange for cash and agrees to buy it back at a later
date at a price agreed in advance, with the difference in the
selling price reflecting the cost of the funding.  This, hence,
represents collateralised long-term funding for the bank selling
the security.   
‘Synthetic repo’ using total return swaps 
A synthetic repo typically combines an outright sale of an
asset (and potential repurchase) with a total return swap (TRS)
derivatives transaction (Figure 1).  
The transaction involves a bank selling an asset to a
counterparty.  At the same time, a TRS is entered into whereby
the bank (the TRS receiver) agrees to pay the counterparty (the
TRS payer) an interest rate of Libor plus a spread and in return
receive any interest payments on the asset.  Importantly, as
part of the TRS, any change in the value of the asset is
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(a) For more information on the analytics required to isolate the impact of interest rate ‘news’
on exchange rates, see Brigden, A, Martin, B and Salmon, C (1997), ‘Decomposing exchange
rate movements according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pages 377–89.
Chart 18 Implied contribution of interest rate ‘news’ to
cumulative changes in sterling bilateral exchange rates
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parties;  falls in its value trigger payments from the bank to the
counterparty and vice versa.  This has the effect of leaving the
economic risk of the asset with the bank, as with a
conventional repo.  In principle, the TRS could be provided by a
third party independent of the asset sale, but this is reportedly
uncommon.
At the end of the transaction, the counterparty will usually sell
the asset;  it will have been compensated by the bank for any
change in the asset’s value through the daily mark-to-market
payments.  
In most cases, the bank will buy back the asset from the
counterparty at the termination of the agreement.  This is
because, while there is no formal obligation for the bank to buy
back the asset, if it is sold to another party, the bank has to
recognise any change in value of the asset.  The assets used
have often been legacy assets issued at a higher price than
their current value.  This gives banks an incentive to buy the
asset back given it will then remain on their banking book and
they can then avoid crystallising a loss.  For this reason, these
transactions are often referred to as ‘failed sales’ for
accounting purposes, as the sale is effectively unwound at the
end of the transaction.  
A synthetic repo TRS structure might seem a complex way of
raising funding when a conventional repo can achieve the
same economic outcome.  However, some institutions prefer
using TRS systems and (ISDA) documentation as they find
them more suited to longer-term trades.  This is partly because
under a TRS, both margin payments and the eventual return of
the asset can be in cash equivalent, rather than in asset form.
In addition, institutions may prefer to retain available repo
lines for short-term funding and investment.
Other ways of a bank raising long-term secured funding are via
securities lending or collateral swaps.  These allow banks to
source liquid assets (eg gilts), which can then be used to raise
funding.  While market contacts report this as an area being
increasingly explored, they suggest that the transactions thus
far have tended to be shorter-dated, and are thus outside the
scope of this box.
Cash borrowers/TRS payers
Prior to the crisis, banks could rely on short-dated unsecured
borrowing and securitisation markets for funding, with 
long-dated repos reportedly rare.  However, lenders’ appetite
for unsecured exposures has since reduced and securitisation
markets have only partially reopened.  
Over the past year, UK banks were thought to have been most
active in raising funding via long-dated secured markets.  It
was reportedly used to refinance collateral that had been
placed in the Bank’s Special Liquidity Scheme.  In addition,
these instruments helped banks meet new regulatory
requirements that aim to lengthen banks’ liquidity and funding
profiles.  
Banks that operate in euro-area member countries were also
thought to have been active in long-dated secured markets
partly in anticipation of scheduled changes to the ECB’s
collateral rules.  These rule changes will increase the cost of
pledging lower-quality collateral with the ECB.  
Lenders/TRS receivers
Long-term secured funding provides counterparties with 
dual recourse in the event of default — to the borrowing bank
and to the underlying collateral.  In contrast, senior debt
holders had recourse only to the former and residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) owners to the latter.  This
increases the attractiveness of long-dated secured funding for
some investors.  The increased use may in part also reflect
investors looking to extend the maturity of lending in return
for higher yields.  
So far, most of the counterparties to these transactions (ie the
repo cash lenders and TRS receivers) have been liquid banks,
which implies that these transactions have mainly recycled
liquidity around the banking system.  Some modest activity
has been reported outside of the banking sector.  Contacts
thought there were a number of obstacles to wider
participation in the market.  This included a lack of familiarity
with a relatively new market, the lack of a liquid secondary
market, and a perception among some potential participants
that TRS structures were too complex. 
Collateral
The long-dated repo market has emerged to help fund ABS
assets that had become illiquid during and after the crisis.
Most of the assets being funded are RMBS, but other types of
ABS (eg student loans, credit card receivables) and corporate
bonds have also been used.  There was some interest in
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Figure 1 Typical synthetic repo structure256 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
funding newly originated ‘own-name’ assets, although the
bank selling the asset had to provide extra collateral to reflect
the potential higher correlation between its credit risk and the
value of the asset. 
The assets used as collateral generally had a minimum rating
of single-A, but market contacts suggested that the majority
of the transactions were against triple-A rated ABS collateral.
Collateral was generally marked-to-market daily with any
related remargining (under a repo) or payment (under a TRS)
then being carried out. 
There appeared to be no market standard for termination
triggers for these transactions, either on the credit rating of the
borrower and/or the quality of the collateral, but some form of
triggers were used in most transactions. 
Pricing
Banks borrowing via long-dated secured transactions were
typically paying a rate above that paid on covered bonds, as
the latter were generally backed by better-quality collateral
and had a more liquid secondary market.  But the rate was
below that payable on senior debt as this was an unsecured
exposure.  
Pricing on individual long-dated secured transactions was
heavily influenced by the perceived credit risk of the
underlying borrower, the term, and quality and diversity of
collateral.  Typically, the bank selling the asset paid a floating
rate between 100–200 basis points over three-month Libor
(Table A).
Table A Typical characteristics of conventional and synthetic 
long-dated repos
Market size UK banks issued over £15 billion in 2010.
Term 2–7 years.
Currency Sterling, US dollars and euros.
Region United States, United Kingdom and Europe.
Borrowers Banks, especially UK banks. 
Lenders Mainly banks, but some asset managers.
Collateral Investment grade, though not defined as liquid by 
regulatory standards.  Usually ABS.
Pricing Floating rate of three-month Libor plus 100–200 
basis points (depending on collateral and counterparty).